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JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. By .David L. Kirp. Berkeley: University of California

Press. 1982. Pp. xiii, 374. $19.95.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education 1
recalls to many comment~tors a moment when morality and constitutional
principle coalesced in a ringing pronouncement that seemed to promise the
transformation of American society.2 Nearly three decades later, the elusiveness of the vision of racial equality mandated by the Court continues to
vex educators, legislators, judges and commentators. In Just Schools,
David Kirp uses case histories of five Bay Area communities - San Francisco, Richmond, Berkeley, Sausalito and Oakland - to provide an unusual glimpse into the multifarious processes that have thwarted realization
of the Brown ideal.
Kirp begins by identifying the linkage in Brown between "racial fairness" and "educational equity" as the fundamental source of complexity in
the "quest for racial justice in education" (p. 1). He then separates the
question of policymaking into two broad categories - uniform versus idiosyncratic standards, and legal versus political modes of decision (p. 1). The
functional interaction of these elements - "process and substance, politics
and principle" - is the focus of his analysis. ''The central puzzle of this
book is: How does an essentially political process involving each branch
and level of government shape race and schooling policy over time, in light
of the larger normative concerns summoned by the question?" (p.11). The
case histories, which comprise Part Two of Just Schools, successfully illuminate this descriptive inquiry. These well-developed studies capture in sharp
relief the personalities and political forces that shaped the course of events
in each community, in much the same way that Richard K.luger captured
the history leading to Brown in Simple Justice .3 Kirp is less successful,
however, at responding in Part Three to the "prescriptive concern: What
mix of politics and constitutionalism, and federal and local decision-making best serves the ends of racial justice?" (pp. 11-12).
Just Schools opens with an examination of the ideal of racial equality in
the context of public education. Kirp suggests that "the Brown decision is
clearer about the nature of the wrong than about the dimensions of the
right" (p. 20). Thepost-Brown notion of racial equality has been conceptualized in three divergent ways. First, the "integrationist" view rejects the
classical liberal insistence on color blindness and requires instead deliberate
racial mixing.4 The "redistributionist" view focuses on improving conditions within the black community. The redistributionist demands remedial
efforts to undo the effects of past discrimination. Finally, the "black
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
2. See Yudof, Nondiscrimination and Beyond, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 97, 97-98 (W.
Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980).
3. R. Kl.UGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
4. Integration is thus distinct from desegregation, the mere removal of formal racial barriers. P. 22.
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power" view "looks not to abolishing the ghetto but to securing the community's control over its institutions" (p. 24). Kirp notes that despite their disparities, these views all contemplate action beyond simply abolishing legal
racism, and thus encounter greater resistance than strategies limited to nondiscrimination (pp. 25-26).
According to Kirp, Brown initially "shift[ed] the terms of discourse" on
educational equality from resources to outcomes (p. 41). Later studies
seemed to indicate that desegregation, even coupled with federal programs
such as Head Start and Title I, had little impact on the educational achievement of minority children and so undermined much of the impetus necessary to sustain desegregation efforts. That educational failure, coupled with
foot-dragging on desegregation in many cities and resegregation resulting
from "white flight," fueled movements in predominantly black urban
school districts away from integration toward "community control" (pp. 4748).
Just Schools then turns to post-Brown legal developments and the interplay of law and politics in the formulation of educational policy. Kirp asserts the importance of constitutional values as a necessary underpinning of
the policy process, and the role of courts as the ultimate arbiter of those
values. He cautions, however, that courts have numerous limitations in the
area of educational dispute resolution. Beginning with Brown II, 5 the
Supreme Court recognized that desegregation decrees must be brokered on
a case-by-case basis. He argues that because "[c]ourts cannot run school
systems" (p. 59), the implementation of their decrees depends on the cooperation of the parties to the dispute.
The five Bay Area case histories provide numerous insights into the conflicts of policy and process earlier explored by Kirp. A few general observations are particularly noteworthy. First, the expectation of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, as described by Richard Kluger, that a Supreme
Court decision declaring segregation unconstitutional would avoid the necessity of"spend[ing] the next half-century arguing cases of unequal educational facilities one by one,"6 has proven chimerical. As Kirp observes,
"The contemporary reality ofrace and schooling policy ... makes a shambles of the hoped-for uniformity. What prevails is not a single national
standard, authoritatively set and effectively implemented, but rather a bewildering diversity of arrangements, ad hoc in nature, varying enormously
both in content and in implementation" (p. 7). Second, judicial demands
for immediate results, such as the "Integrate Now" command of Alexander
v. Holmes County Board ofEducation, 1 ignore the reality that desegration is
a complicated process that does require a great deal of preparation. In San
Francisco, a federal court allowed only six weeks for formulating a desegregation plan; the hastily devised plan that resulted was seriously flawed.
More "deliberation" and less "speed" might have produced a plan whose
consequences would have done much more to advance racial equality (pp.
101-03, 107-10).
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
6. R. Kl.UGER, supra note 3, at 284.
7. 396 U.S. 19 (1969). See also B. WOODWARD &
(1979).
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In Part Three, Kirp evaluates the status and prospects of the educational
systems and desegregation plans of his five communities. He finds that the
turmoil and extremism which characterized much of the 1960s and 1970s
has dissipated (pp. 254-55). In San Francisco, the first major northern city
to desegregate under court order, bureaucratic indifference crippled a premature plan that "stressed racial balance and had little educational content" (p. 261). In Sausalito and Berkeley, which integrated voluntarily after
elaborate and comprehensive preparation, the systems were hardly in place
before conflicting forces of "black power, separatism, and experimentalism"
(p. 259) began to displace them. In Richmond, opponents of desegregation
gained firm control of the schools, and in cutting the budget, eliminated
busing from the voluntary open enrollment plan which marked the extent
of the district's commitment to racial equality in education (pp. 145-46,
260). "In Oakland, demography outpaced policy" (p. 258); efforts were
refocused, as in other overwhelmingly black urban districts like Detroit and
Atlanta, on asserting black control over the administration and resources of
the system (p. 262).
Kirp has succeeded in posing the significant problems involved in
achieving racial equality in education, and his case histories make a worthwhile addition to the literature on the subject. His conclusion, however, in
which he proposes policy directions for the future, is less satisfactory. His
largely dispassionate presentation of those issues and events neglects to take
value-based positions critical to his concluding policy arguments.
What is glaringly absent from Just Schools is any appreciation of the
value of the constitutional right mandated by Brown. The educational benefits of desegregation are identified in Making Desegregation Work, 8 an impressive recent study that makes a fine companion volume to Just Schools.
Making Desegregation Work emphasizes that schools teach important
things that are not measured by achievement test scores. They "do not just
teach youth; they socialize youth into adulthood." 9 Moreover, William
Ryan, a psychologist, argues that educational dividends are irrelevant to
racial equality in providing desegregated schools. He observes, "When
drinking fountains were desegregated, no one expected the water quality to
improve; when lunch counters were desegregated, the hamburgers and
Cokes didn't taste any better . . . . And no one expected black kids in desegregated swimming pools to start swimming faster. . . ." 10 For Ryan,
educational benefits are not necessary to justify Brown's holding; desegregathm is morally essential.
In contrast, Kirp is equivocal toward the constitutional principle involved in equal educational treatment. He purports to disagree with the
Supreme Court's requirement of proof of intentional segregation 11 in cases
involving Northern school districts. He argues that "the injury that children suffer from racial separation has nothing to do with its cause. Does a
8. R. CRAIN, R. MAHARD & R. NAROT, MAKING DESEGREGATION WORK (1982) [hereinafter cited as CRAIN].
9. Id. at 12.
10. W. RYAN, EQUALITY 159 (1981).
11. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. l, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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black fourth grader know that her school is 95 percent black only because
officials gerrymandered the attendance zone? Does it matter?" (p. 285).
Kirp instead favors uniform minimum integration, defined by Justice
Powell in his separate opinion in Keyes v. School District, 12 as a baseline
constitutional principle. He adds, "[b]eyond the uniform minimum obligation, racial concerns are, as Justice Powell notes, properly weighed against
'other, equally important educational interests which a community may assert' " 13 (p. 286). Presumably the weighing process would rule out busing,
since Justice Powell is one of the Court's strongest advocates of the value of
"neighborhood schools." 14 In fact, Kirp argues that a showing of intent
should be required when district-wide or metropolitan-wide relief is contemplated (pp. 287-88). Thus, his minimum constitutional standard is minimal indeed .
. Yet, having insisted on a segregative intent test to justify district or metropolitan-wide remedies, Kirp closes by deploring the racial gap between
city and suburban schools. He notes that the number of urban school systems with majority-white enrollment dropped from four of the ten largest
and sixteen of the thirty largest in 1968, to one of ten and eight of thirty
only eight years later (p. 301). He concludes:
Such a transformation jeopardizes our sense of the public school as an institution critical to the nation's well-being . . . . These schools may instead come to be regarded as a welfare service, provided as a matter of
largesse to the less favored members of the society. That perception of
public schools as charity schools was strongly resisted by American educators a century and a half ago. With good reason: if this view becomes
widely held, it can only hasten the decline of the institution. [Pp. 301-02.]
Having ended on this note, Kirp muses, "It is easier to suggest in broad
terms what is wanted than to imagine how this might presently be pursued
..." (p. 302). In Just Schools, the easier path is well travelled; the more
12. A system would be integrated in accord with constitutional standards if the responsible authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate faculties and administration;
(ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, instruction, and curriculum opportunities
throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to draw attendance zones to promote
integration; and (iv) locate new schools, close old ones, and determine the size and grade
categories with this same objective in mind.
413 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. 413 U.S. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. l, 102 S. Ct. 3187, 3208 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling ••••"),
The evils of busing are largely symbolic, however, and the vehemence of the opposition to
busing is completely discordant with the facts concerning it. Over 50% of America's children
are bused to school, and less than 7% of those are bused for racial purposes. K. ARRINGTON,
WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 1954-19?? 37 (U.S. Commn. on Civil Rights, Clearing House
Publication 69, 1981). Often, integration of a metropolitian area decreases its school busing
overall. See Pettigrew, The Case far Metropolitan Approaches to Public-Schoo/ Desegregation,
in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 163, 171-72 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981). Students walking to school are three times as likely to be involved in accidents
as those transported by bus. K. ARRINGTON, supra, at 38. Students' academic achievement
and feelings about their school are largely unaffected by busing itself. See CRAIN, supra note
8, at 58-60. Finally, metropolitan-area school systems may increase cost efficiency by eliminating wasteful duplication of facilities in adjacent districts. Florida has adopted a system of
county-wide school districts, motivated by cost efficiency, not integration. See Pettigrew, supra
at 171.
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difficult remains largely uncharted. 15

15. Kirp's book has also been reviewed in Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1982, at 16.

